Since its inception, the Journal of Forensic Accounting   has provided continuous global leadership to the discipline of forensic accounting. If your're capable of working at the leading edge of a rapidly evolving discipline, we invite you to particpate by authoring a submission on an item appearing on this radar scope of future forensic accounting research:

What are false financials worth to management? In a large number of fraudulent financial reporting cases, management explicitly pays to engage in an underlying transaction, the sole purpose of which is to improperly record the transaction and thus create deceptive financial statements. We seek research which measures these payments and correlates these with both the improper recordation of the transaction and the financial statement manipulation effect.

By citing statistics that show financial statement auditors have recently been a meager source of fraud discovery (as compared to say, whistleblowers), some researchers seem to imply that the financial statement audit function is inherently unsuitable to this purpose. We seek research that distinguishes between function and design, and posits alternative financial statement audit designs which may be more suitable to the purpose of fraud discovery.

Beyond (eventually) crashing market capitalization (shareholder value) in an enterprise, fraudulent financial reporting often creeps through the financial system in less obvious ways. For example, a recent SEC complaint alleges that a "massive financial fraud ... facilitated the company's ... merger". We seek research that explores epiphenominal fraudulent events that occur in the period between initiation and public disclosure of the fraudulent financial reporting activity. What are the likely derivative frauds, and how might the economic impact of these be measured? Is the "but-for" method alone sufficient?

Recognizing that historical terms such as "white collar crime" are inadequate to the task, we seek research which identifies distinguishing characteristics of "C/D-level fraud" as a special class of management fraud against the corporation. In particular, how might pressure, opportunity, rationalization, and specialized knowledge of C/D personnel be analyzed so as to deliver a meaningful risk assessment?

Some recent research offers various reasons why earnings management (non-neutral financial reporting) is "good." One idea, for example, suggests that managers will deliver poor economic management over a longer time period if they are unable to commit earnings management in the short term. This approach seems to neglect, among other things, the stewardship role of accounting. We seek research that highlights the stewardship role of financial reporting and posits governance frameworks to manifest this aspect more rapidly.

Some number of industry observers and participants express the defeatist attitude that fraudulent financial reporting, when perpetrated through collusion of senior management, is "almost impossible" to detect. Yet, it is also readily apparent that "cooking a company's books is a team sport," and "it is physically and logistically impossible for one executive to engineer and hide a multibillion-dollar accounting fraud." One can only wonder how such mega-frauds, involving tens of people, could possibly withstand even the simplest probing. We seek research which turns the conspiratorial nature of collusion around on itself: What are the dynamics of communication in such environments?

Some psychological theories predict that when people are exposed to a new signal that contradicts a continuing previous signal to which they have adapted, they begin to demonstrate aberrant behavior. Might such theories be applied to organizations that have had an underlying "dynamic of dishonesty" (the original signal) and have recently implemented strictures of "codes of ethics" (the new signal)? If so, what might examples of the aberrant behavior be? Might the lack of aberrant behavior indicate that the second signal is somehow neutralized?

It has been found that financial reporting frauds, particularly those which involve widespread collusion, quite often adopt non-standard slang or "code words" to describe non-GAAP activities. We seek submissions which a) survey the use of such code words, and b) propose strategies to identify the use of such code words as a component of a general fraud risk assessment.

We seek theoretical submissions which posit broad new fundamental principles for economic transaction and reporting event evidence. In addition, we seek submissions which apply existing evidentiary models such as Locard's Exchange Principle or "evidentiary dynamics" in innovative, non-obvious ways.

Recent research suggests that damaged auditor reputation can have a significant negative impact on client firm valuation. We seek research that seeks to correlate positive auditor reputation, in particular as it relates to advanced fraud detection methodologies, and abnormal (positive) client firm valuations.

Exploration of "incentivized" transactions and how they may be abused.

Explorations of regulatory capture and the frequency and consequence (economic magnitude) of executive management fraudulent financial reporting.

Explorations of M&A due diligence liability when acquiring firm uses fraudulently inflated stock.

All aspects of "disclosure controls and procedures."

We invite contributions which seek to trace the history and evolution of the language of statutory audit opinions; in particular, interpretations of "present fairly" that consider aspects such as "without bias or dishonesty," "marked by impartiality and honesty," and "free from self-interest" and attempt to draw distinctions between Executive Management Fraudulent Financial Reporting and Employee Fraud.

Join the debate!   It is now widely acknowledged that audit committees, the leading entity in corporate governance, are at the mercy of "the daily manoeuvrings of full-time, hands-on executives who inevitably only feed them information on a 'need-to-know' basis." Further, external auditors remain reluctant to bridge this gap. Instead, the auditing industry is lobbying for "increasing corporate overview in the form of independent (sic) internal audit departments as the principal means by which companies and directors can be assured that no impropriety is occurring." An alternative suggestion, a modified version of the "joint-auditing" concept, is that forensic accountants, acting as professional audit advisors to audit committees, oversee and drive the performance of external auditors to achieve this outcome. Obviously, the external auditing industry finds this latter proposal unattractive. - What do you think? We'll report on the consensus.

Many hold that free markets are the cure for most problems. In order for free markets to function effectively, however, both competition and risk are required. We seek explorations that explore competition and risk within statutory audit environments.

We seek comparative analyses of employee "codes of conduct" as published by Global 500 public companies; including aspects of implementation and adherance.

Explorations that propose models which seek to determine the validity of judgements associated with accrual related estimates and accounting policy choices: deconstruction and reassembly within a framework of neutral financial reporting.

Frequent anecdotal reports from university faculty ascribe a dramatic increase in undergraduate accounting majors to be directly related to student perceptions of the role of accounting in the recent corporate financial scandals. We seek research which seeks to measure student satisfaction upon graduation vis-a-vis their expectations and perceived preparation for meaningful accounting careers.

"Willful blindness" as it relates to the reckless conduct of public company audit committee failures to recognize the catastrophic severity of executive management fraud and to develop the requisite specific interventions.

Earlier research has suggested that audit management communication may bias the work-product of frontline auditors. We seek studies which explore the segregation of the risk assessment phase of statutory audits so as to avoid this communication bias and the concomitant frontline auditor bias to adapt to engagement management preferences.

Perhaps surprisingly, some of the firms that have experienced the most flagrant incidents of executive management financial reporting fraud have also had the most stringent employee anti-theft programs. This seems similar to those managements that proclaim "zero tolerance" (the louder the better), but do little to extend meaningful scrutiny and transparency to their own activities. In addition, more recently a company press release blames former "employees" for improper adjustments to inventory and other accounts, yet it seems only "managers" would have the ability to make such adjustments. We seek studies that attempt to measure and explain these phenomena. In addition, we seek proposals that would require clearer disclosures of personnel type for better measurement purposes.

"Everybody's doing it" has long been used as a standard example of "rationalization" within the "fraud triangle" framework of the necessary conditions of financial fraud. Some provocative new research, however, argues that when actors find themselves in environments where everybody is in fact doing it, this conception becomes "a rational incentive." The researcher suggests that such environments are more prevalent than commonly acknowledged, and goes on to argue that in such environments "you're putting yourself at a disadvantage if you don't." We seek explorations that identify characteristics of such environments and consider the array of decision variables and practical options available to individual actors in such environments.

In a recent ManagementConsultancy.co.uk interview, the Global Chairman of a Big Four accounting firm predicts a further sharp rise in 2005 audit fees on the heels of recent SarBox increases: "As we move into the section 404 reviews in 2005, we'll see significant increases in fees. The Big Four - with unlimited liability - will be asking for significant fee increases. In the US it will definitely be double-digit, outside of the US it will be less so." So continues the international lobbying effort to limit audit firm liability. In that a common element in some of the more egregious recent financial scandals has been auditor negligence or even collusion with executive management, we seek creative independent proposals which attempt to balance audit firm responsibilty and liability. Preference will be given to proposals that strike a leadership position by tackling the priority of active detection of executive management financial reporting fraud (the only kind of corporate fraud where there is catastrophic risk to the enterprise) first, and then addressing related liability accomodations - not vice versa. In addition, however, given the recalcitrancy of the industry generally to squarely accept responsibility for active detection of executive management fraudulent financial reporting in public companies, we seek discussions which explore new enforcement models that obviate the threatened "nuclear bomb" of one of the remaining "Big Four" failing; for example, court ordered client industry bans, firm restructuring under new management, etc.

Theoretical considerations of "neutrality" in financial reporting practice (not just reporting standards), particularly as it relates to "fair presentation." In addition, submissions which explore measurement of deviation from neutrality or seek to dispel popular confusion with "conservatism" are welcome.

Descriptive analysis of the limits of pretexting, deception, and the use of informants in non-criminal engagements.

It has been observed that trust violation offends the community sense of justice in direct proportion to the amount of transferred trust. In addition, it has been argued that some combination of community shunning and "reintegrative shaming" of identified trust violators is one effective method of deterrence of future potential offenders. Yet, current SEC enforcement mechanisms primarily rely upon contractual agreements that allow no admission of guilt, thus removing the more general societal controls of shunning and shaming. We seek research into relevant social mechanisms which might provide insight into how better to align community justice with economic crime in public markets.

Much of Sarbanes-Oxley is focused on processes. The problem, however, is that Executive Management Fraudulent Financial Reporting is often accomplished by the way of policies. We seek research that seeks to identify the most problematic policy choices, typically those that promise "reporting advantages."

Exploration of the powerful concept of "variable assumptions" within evidentiary analysis, where evidential elements are supplied by adversarial stipulation or testimony.

Prior to SAS No. 99, frontline auditors were primarily rewarded (via promotion) for "audit efficiency" and "client relations." What evidence is there that auditors are now rewarded for detection of financial statement misrepresentation caused by fraud?

Industry insiders report that even within the largest forensic accounting groups there is little formalized post-engagement analysis and review, and that whatever informal systems previously in existence for this purpose are now routinely bypassed due to the current large workload. We seek submissions regarding all aspects of forensic accounting post engagement "debriefings" and other data gathering and engagement analysis techniques. In addition, we seek submissions on how forensic accounting groups transform this data into internal forensic accounting knowledgebases, and how these knowledgebases are used.

We seek submissions regarding the psychology of forensic accounting engagements. For example, some observers claim that an education and training regimen that generally stresses "conformity" and "obedience to doctrine" results in a practitioner mindset which habitually seeks to limit intrusive activities or construction of independent hypotheses when just such activities or hypotheses are required. Such observers note the incongruity of such conceptions as "trusted advisor" and "independent observer," and suggest that mental models of "role" and peer expectation influence engagement outcomes to an extent not sufficiently recognized. In addition, topics such as rationalizing advocacy, depersonalization of targets as "files," reasons for above-industry attrition levels of front-line forensic accountants, misanthropical tendencies within the profession, and subject confrontation or other stressors are invited. Considerations of psychological testing and screening of forensic accountants, personality profiles of successful forensic accountants vis-a-vis performance metrics, and risk factors for the comprimising of forensic accountants.

We seek research on the psychology of fraud perpetrators that seeks correlations with the AICPA categories of financial fraud. For example, narcissistic personality disorder has been suggested as a contributing factor in some instances of management fraud whereas resentment and disgruntlement have been identified as likely contributing factors in some instances of employee fraud. We seek extensions and validation of this research using contemporary examples; in particular, models which seek to map such factors to specific fraud risk metrics.

How best might abductive interpretation of financial "evidence in search of a theory" supplement inductive reasoning based on experience?

Poor regulation, deregulation, and even unintended consequences of "good" regulation may provide opportunities for financial mischief. We seek submissions that monitor changes in regulatory environments of all markets, predicts opportunities for abuse resultant from legislative or administrative action, and posits anticipatory controls or evidentiary identification techniques for potential resultant financial fraud.

Collusion and other quid pro quo behaviors turn the fundamental financial accounting assumption of "arms-length transactions" on its head. How should this assumption be changed? What are the likely ramifications of such a change?

We seek studies which explore measures of client satisfaction while considering engagement parameters.

Studies of financial transaction reporting environments that attempt to model variabilities and vulnerabilities at all human-system interfaces.

At a most fundamental level, "red flags" or other indications of potential fraud are no more than deviations of reported values from factual economic values. We seek new, quantitatively-based, financial reporting models constructed from the "bottom-up."

Anticipatory, future-oriented forensic accounting engagements are becoming more common. We seek research which considers various strategies and standards for such future-oriented assurance services.

A significant number of recent financial reporting scandals have revealed widespread collusion among large numbers of people with varying degrees of participation. Others have revealed industry wide abuses. Taken together, a number of financial analysts have recently expressed the opinion that in such environments there is usually some "leakage" of the knowledge of the fraudulent reporting to non-participants and that this information is actually captured in the stock prices of these firms. Studies seeking to correlate industry sub-segment stock price performance or volatility versus the general market as a possible fraudulent financial reporting risk indicator (while attempting to isolate fraud premium or discount from other economic forces) are invited.

Executive Management Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The Unmanaged Risk. Section 404 of SarBox, implemented with PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2, requires executive management to certify responsibility for designing and supervising internal controls of financial reporting. It is widely recognized, however, that management can intentionally override or circumvent internal controls; and that executive management fraudulent financial reporting is generally beyond the scope of SarBox/COSO mandated internal controls ("the fox guarding the chicken coop"). We seek submissions which address this obvious structural weakness. In particular, innovative methods to detect collusion or improper overrides.

SarBox section 302 certifications, as implemented by the SEC, seek "a standard of overall material accuracy and completeness that is broader than financial reporting requirements under generally accepted accounting principles." What role might forensic accountants play in assisting firms meet this new, higher standard of financial reporting?

Documentary identification, collection, and verification is typically an important early phase of a forensic investigation. We seek creative, outside-the-box submissions on non-obvious documentary evidence which may shed light on contemporaneous beliefs of actors.

The AICPA suggests that there are three categories of fraud: management fraud, employee fraud, and external fraud. We seek research which attempts to measure the total cost of fraud by each category. It is important that costs (losses) by category be measured so that the cost of targeted proactive fraud detection or minimization programs can be reasonably justified to management and/or the board. Cost estimates should include direct losses to the firm, including investigation and litigation costs. In addition, more ambitious extensions that consider reduced market capitalization, cost of capital, opportunity costs, and costs to the external economy, such as lost jobs, pension losses, tax losses, etc. would be valuable contributions.

We seek research into all aspects of undisclosed quid pro quo transactional relationships; e.g., "side-agreements" and "swap," "non-monetary," "round-tripping," and "three (or more) way" transactions. Definitional and evidentiary aspects are critical.

We seek submissions proposing innovative tools for fraud detection that draw upon other disciplines in unique ways; for example, tools which build upon spatial, networking, or communication analytics.

We seek research relating to investigatory locus and prosecutorial venue which considers factors as diverse as evidentiary laws and jurisdictional "turf battles."

CA/CPA forensic accountants perform valuations based on a neutral analysis of economic reality. We seek research which explores bias in "accounting policy choices" and the development and communication of assumptions or estimates used for financial reporting purposes. Similarly, we seek research into areas of high economic value where disparities in interpretations exist, including identification of causes of disparity (e.g. novelty or complexity of the economic activity, inadequacy of standards, etc.).

A new paradigm is emerging that public company audit committee members, rather than being qualified merely on financial literacy, instead be primarily qualified on their independence and integrity, their judgmental role in mediating external auditor and company management accounting policy disputes, and their determination to eliminate improper external auditor-company management collusion. We seek descriptive submissions which support this paradigm by demonstrating how CPA forensic accountants are uniquely qualified to act as "professional audit advisors" to audit committees, so as to assist them in "asking the right questions."

Forensic accounting research paradise? Many forensic accounting researchers have lamented that, for a variety of reasons, there is insufficient data to conduct rigorous research; and that what data does exist is not often fully useful (e.g. limited SEC segregation of audit fees). At some point the PCAOB, with unprecendented access to both audit firm and client data, will have cleared their plate sufficiently to turn their attention to a stated goal of research support. What might be some of the data forensic accounting researchers would wish for the PCAOB to collect? Recognizing it won't be tomorrow, and presuming SarBox implementation data is a given, what other data might the PCAOB collect that would benefit fundamental forensic accounting research? Assuming the PCAOB establishes rigorous general guidelines and practices for data sharing, data collection suggestions should include relevant proprietary or other attributory considerations specific to the desired data. Alternatively, what other sources of data might be desired? For example, treasury activities of many non-bank public companies have aspects similar to banks, yet they are not required to file derivative and other exposure statements with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), as banks are. It is hoped that identification of the universe of desired data might result in either obtaining the data directly or construction of indirect measures or correlates.
Alternatively, some suggest that forensic accounting researchers, instead of facing a paucity of information, actually suffer from a kind of "dirty data overload." Rather than a lack of access, the problem seems to be deciding just what data should be focused on. If true, what factors bear upon the topics selected for forensic accounting research?

"It's the evidence stupid." We seek descriptive submissions which explore all aspects of evidence in financial fraud. In particular, we seek submissions which explore enhanced anticipatory guidelines for auditor discovery, modal signals regarding "sufficient competent evidential matter" and probative evidence, and studies which explore correlations of evidence to the legal elements of fraud for specific types of fraud, with likely signals for evidence tampering or concealment.

The role of board Audit committees in preventing management fraud is under intense study. We seek research which, within a fraud risk framework, considers the role of Nomination/Executive Search and Executive Compensation committees (and external advisors to these committees) in the selection of senior managers and the structure of management incentive programs.

We seek creative submissions that propose novel proactive fraud detection techniques that leverage existing business systems or processes. For example, many firms routinely conduct "exit interviews." How might an analogy with "vendor confirmations" be constructed? Some firms use RFID or other technologies to track employee (and visitor) movement and/or communication. What red-flags might be relevant and how might network analytics be constructed to signal such flags? Many large firms construct "knowledge bases" or other documents that are shared between employees. How might fraud detection or deterrence programs leverage these?

We seek submissions regarding file assignment considerations and methodologies within larger forensic accounting firms. How formalized are these?

We seek submissions regarding "planned bankruptcy," in particular reconstructive, valuation, and evidentiary considerations in such circumstances.

Forensic accountants recognize that SarbOx, while helpful, is not the end of corporate fraud; and that just as the categories and types of corporate fraud differ, so too does the actual or expected magnitude of each occurrence. We seek submissions proposing powerful economic models to measure specific fraud types; in particular, "catastrophic frauds."

If executive management fraudulent financial reporting is to be sytematically minimized, all elements of corporate governance need to be function properly. As the only tool shareholder owners have available to obtain compensation for damages caused by executive management fraudulent financial reporting, class action lawsuits are an important element in the corporate governance mix. Many observers argue, however, that the securities class action lawsuit arena is in shambles: claims relating to genuine executive management fraudulent financial reporting are routinely narrowed or dismissed, and others are restricted to tenuous (and not strictly relevant) arguments based on "statements," while obvious co-conspirators enjoy statutory protection. More importantly, however, an increasing number of frivolous cases are being brought based on no more than stock price volatility. We seek case law analysis and/or legislative initiatives that will isolate genuine cases of executive management fraudulent financial reporting, increase the likelihood of successful shareholder claims in such instances, and simultaneously create a clear conceptual and legal divide between fraudulent (actionable) financial reporting acts and simply poor judgment. Alternatively, we would enjoy submissions that might explore the limitations on the difference between equity risk in poor managerial decision making and equity risk in fraudulent management behavior.

Progress in data mining for fraud detection continues. We seek research that accelerates this progress by focusing on the design of underlying data models and structures with an eye toward early fraud detection and transaction/reporting event accountability.

We seek fundamental research into forensic accountant litigation success and failure.

Some leading industry thinkers have proposed that financial statements evolve to become more flexible and realistic. Others suggest that only a totality of qualitative and quantitative information reported "in accordance with the law and current accounting standards" is sufficient to provide decision-usefulness to shareholders and other stakeholders. We seek research which explores the challenges of neutral reporting using multiple alternative estimates, ranges, and scientific models of uncertainty; considerations of standards for increasingly complex disclosures; and preservation of proprietary rights, managerial prerogatives, and competitive advantage in a transparent environment.

We seek research which recognizes the potential tradeoff between increased volatility of firm valuation and neutral financial reporting with better measurement; as well as research which considers likely firm behaviorial changes in light of enhanced neutral financial reporting with better measurement.

Almost every state has adopted the 150-hour requirement to sit for the CPA exam. Despite this, some critics maintain that the requirement is the legacy of a failed vision for the profession that included a "growing demand for CPAs to provide clients with a wide range of professional services." We seek submissions which reevaluate the desirability of a 150-hour requirement in light of SarBox and the tremendous current imbalance in market demand for new CPA's. In addition, we seek submissions that propose model curricula for CPA's seeking advanced education in forensic accounting; including consideration of preferred experiential training.

We seek explorations into the relationship between financial reporting bias and risk. For example, corporate managers continue to structure asymmetrical transactions and arrangements to obtain "financial reporting advantages," auditors and other advisors continue to assist clients in structuring such transactions so as to avoid the intent of accounting standards, and corporate directors are schooled on “What Makes Off-Balance Sheet Financing Legitimate.” How should associated risks be identified, measured, and disclosed in a neutral fashion (including the multiplier effect of leverage)? Are there necessary connections with financial reporting frameworks, corporate governance philosophies, or firm valuation?

A typical Fortune 500 annual report states that the company uses off-balance sheet arrangements to "improve shareholder returns." Yet, upon adoption of FIN 46, while consolidating existing SPEs onto the books, the firm discontinued executing new "sponsored" SPE transactions while continuing "third-party" SPE transactions. If monetization/securitization of assets through sponsored SPEs were part of the "ordinary course of business" and they "improved shareholder returns," why were they discontinued?

While there has been some progress on understanding auditor "negotiation" or "bargaining" dynamics, we seek extension of this research which fully recognizes the two-pronged "power imbalance" faced by typical front-line auditors of public companies, simultaneously within their own firm and with the client. For example, we seek research which attempts to correlate public company financial restatements with a) characteristics of engagement partners and front-line auditors, including reporting and incentive structures, and b) characteristics of C-level executives.

In a 12/98 speech, Walter P. Schuetze, the Chief Accountant of the SEC enforcement division, observed that: "It appears to me that some auditors and their families, through social contacts, are getting so close to and so involved with their clients and their clients' families that a disinterested observer would question whether the auditor's objectivity had not been clouded or perhaps even enveloped." We seek research into fraternization of auditor firm employees and clients as an element of fraud risk which should be measured and modeled.

In the same 12/98 speech, Walter P. Schuetze, asked: "Will it take long before investors bid down the prices of securities in our markets to factor in the uncertainty arising from possible bad numbers and inadequate disclosures? Perhaps the bidding-down process is already silently taking place. Will investors stop drinking from the well called audits by "independent certified public accountants" and sample the water in other wells. You may say that there are no other comparable wells. Not so. When investors begin to believe that their interests are not being protected by external auditors, those investors will find an alternative to protect their interests, in ways other than an audit by independent certified public accountants." We seek submissions that posit new roles for forensic accountants in firm valuations, beyond that of mere analysts of published financial statements.

We seek analytical research into all aspects of known instances of management override of internal controls.

There is no question that expanded and targeted auditor "walkthroughs" will improve both fraud detection and deterrence. We wish to see submissions which explore "auditing by walking around (ABWA)" techniques, including management attempts to monitor or restrict auditor activities (especially relating to operational employee interviews).

We seek forward looking hypotheses based on gaming or other theories that anticipate responses of unethical corporate actors to heightened scrutiny and new anti-fraud controls or standards.

We seek non-attributive reports into how auditors are using their new-found access to audit committees, instances of auditor-management conflict which has risen to the level of direct audit committee involvement, and insights into auditor-audit committee communications and dynamics.

Industry insiders report that SEC employment of CPA's has fluctuated greatly over the years in both percentage terms and absolute numbers. We seek verification of this. For example, by a longitudinal study of CPA employment at the SEC since 1933.

By the nature of the associated transaction or reporting event, many accounting judgments are made outside the scope of routine controls. We seek exploration of circumstances of independent (re-)estimates by auditors for comparison with management estimates, and extensions which go beyond GAAP and seek correlations of singular instances with likely management bias or fraud.

In an August 2003 speech at the AAA Annual Meeting, Arthur R. Wyatt described how, in the 1970s, an audit firm resigned from all audits in two separate industries because the firm disagreed with particular accounting principles that were accepted in the industry. We seek research which explores how audit firms, by taking tough stances on principles, help to inform the dialogue surrounding the interpretation of standards.

Forensic accountants recognize that adherence to GAAP alone is insufficient to ensure correct and fair financial reporting; and insist, therefore, upon the higher standard of neutral financial reporting. We seek new examinations of the "reasonable man" standard as it applies to fair presentation, the diminishment via divergence of fair presentation from "reasonable assurance" relating to material misstatement, the new emphasis on the "verifiability" component of "reliability" over the "neutrality" component, and others, that, while tracing precedents from US vs Simon onward, recognize industry and regulatory reluctance and posit or trace new civil strategies.

Regulatory and enforcement agencies worldwide are staffing up with professional forensic accountants. Typically, however, involvement of such public sector forensic accountants commences after much of the economic damage is already done. We seek submissions which demonstrate the economic value of utilizing private sector forensic accountants in a peremptory (as of right, without cause) fashion, while considering multiple perspectives: that of firm management, shareholders, regulated markets, and other stakeholders.

In the wake of the recent corporate scandals many industry groups proclaimed that, in "the public interest," it was time to "work together" to get ahead of the problem of corporate fraud. While SarbOx and the PCAOB move audit committees, management, and auditors forward quite dramatically, where are the other industry groups? Some suggest that without commensurate movement by other groups, corporate fraud will, at best, remain a problem; and at worst it may cause an eventual blowout in the auditing industry due to imbalanced responsibilities. We seek submissions which propose new roles for other stakeholder or industry groups. (We note that it is possible to identify numerous such groups by those the SEC fines. For example, of the 1713 SEC enforcement actions concluded on "securities professionals" - as defined under SarBox - between 1998-2001, only 66 (or 4%) involved independent auditors or independent auditing firms. Again, where are the commensurate proactive changes within the non-auditor groups? How might some proactive changes in non-audit groups best blend with those of the auditing profession? What might be the role of forensic accountants in shaping reforms on these non-auditor groups?)

A federal judge has recently dismissed lawsuits against Corning Inc. that alleged fraud by top company officials who made optimistic statements before steep businees downturns in 2001 (http://www.timesdaily.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040414/APF/404140676). District Judge Charles Siragusa found that a "rosy depiction of future growth" should not have misled investors, citing a previous court ruling that "puffery or misguided optimism is not actionable as fraud." We seek submissions that, while exploring corporate governance frameworks, addresses "puffery" as a form of non-neutral financial reporting, and compares the "for the purpose of influencing behavior" element of non-neutral reporting (as defined by the FASB) with the "intent to induce reliance" legal element of fraud, and considers, from the perspective of individual shareholders (the nominal owners of the corporation), the limits of "puffery" as an acceptable mode of shareholder communication.

Research into the relationship of organizational structures to fraud occurrence continues. In addition, however, we seek submissions exploring organizational dynamics and the occurrence of fraud. For example, some managers in some firms explicitly seek "personal loyalty" from subordinates. Others insist upon "organizational," "mission," or some other "outside" loyalty. Do the manifestations of such loyalties correlate to fraud or corruption occurrences? Also, for example, some businesses employ "360°" performance reviews. Can any meaningful correlations with such dynamics and the occurrence of fraud in general, or with particular fraud categories or classes of fraud, be developed?

We seek submissions regarding the occurrence of fraud within transitional environments, with emphasis on anticipatory preventative planning.

We seek submissions on composite scenario based analytics for early fraud detection.

We seek research into "disclosure management" and other non-quantitative aspects, in particular examination of standards for disclosure notes and instances of obfuscation or distortion.

While forensic accountants generally acknowledge that integrity of management and their propensity to commit fraud is a significant factor to be considered in developing an overall fraud risk estimate, the challenge of developing usable tests or substantiating "gut feels" remains. We seek research that initiates practical progress in this area.

We seek submissions on the involvement of forensic accountants in the design or testing of compliance programs at public companies. What are the substantive differences in these types of consultative engagements?

We seek research which identifies, correlates, and contrasts relevant fraud risk, detection, and deterrence variables by AICPA fraud categories. Further, we seek extensions of species toplogies for construction of a fully-vetted, comprehensive corporate financial fraud ontologies.

Forensic accountants obtain engagements through a variety of sources, such as corporate counsel, audit committees, audit committee counsels, insurance companies, underwriters, management, etc. We seek research which attempts to quantify the source of CA/CPA forensic accountant engagements at public companies. In addition, we'd like to see research which explores fraud category and engagement source correlations.

An important role for CPA forensic accountants is that of "professional audit advisors" to audit committees, as well as to CEO's and CFO's who are required to file certifications under SarbOx. We seek research relating to risk assessment measures used in such circumstances, in particular disaggregated analytics which identify the universe of variables that should be modeled so as to quantify such an assessment (e.g., hierarchical levels, transaction/reporting system interface differences, insurability limits, levels of budgetary/operational authority, etc.) for task prioritization and activity targeting (AS/NZS 4360). Research in this area that utilizes the semi-structured data gathering technique of personal practitioner interviews will receive the utmost preferential consideration, while field-based questionnaires will receive some preferential consideration.

CA/CPA forensic accountants are uniquely qualified to tackle financial reporting fraud by management. Much current doctrine, however, is limited to detection of financial reporting fraud through analysis of financial statements. We seek research which breaks new ground by correlating significant business processes and events with fraud risk prior to and during report roll up or staging obfuscation. (In addition, we seek research with identifies weaknesses within various roll up or staging methodologies themselves.) Further, we seek theoretical consideration of the proper neutral financial reporting treatments of these processes/events and comparison with allowable deviations within GAAS, GAAP, or other standards.

There is considerable anecdotal evidence that speed of regulatory enforcement is much too slow. We seek research which will accelerate regulatory intervention at all levels and reduce the negative economic effects of firms with inferior business models operating under deceptively staged financial reporting. For example, fraudulent financial reports may allow firms to issue stock which is then used to acquire legitimate firms; and competitive reactions to firms with fraudulent financial reporting may cause long-lasting industry deformations. While research which more accurately measures such economic effects is anticipated (see item above), more focused analysis on critical early regulatory intervention activities is required. Research which proposes novel private sector incentives to spur or obviate regulatory intervention will receive preferential consideration.

Forensic accountants seek evidence sufficient to withstand adversarial scrutiny in a court of law. We seek creative research which identifies new or innovative control methodologies which improve the quality of potential evidence (both direct and indirect) in an anticipatory way, while minimizing additional cost.

Forensic accountants are more often than not engaged as a member of a forensic investigation team (FIT). We seek research into FIT composition, structure, and dynamics.

Notwithstanding the exact requirements of SAS 99, recent speeches by members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signal an increased focus on whether auditors are uncovering fraud at public companies. We seek descriptive submissions which anticipate the regulatory challenges. In addition, we seek submissions that propose novel or creative regulatory requirements or structures, the implementation of which would either dramatically reduce the occurrence of fraud or increase the detection thereof.

We seek research which explores non-obvious fraud-risk factors or indicators.

We seek research which explores the prevalence and effect of stock and bond underwriters use of firm indemnity agreements in conjunction with the issuance of new securities or derivative contracts. (Elimination of exposure loss in such circumstances seems to diminish incentives for underwriters to conduct aggressive due diligence in an attempt to reduce default risk.) For example, does the use of such agreements affect the price of the security or contract? If not, why not? If so, does the price differential reflect the risk? Do such agreements allocate loss exposure appropriately? Are such agreements contrary to good public policy? Lacking such indemnification agreements, how might components of an underwriters due diligence resemble the fraud risk assessment/response undertaken by forensic accountants acting as professional audit advisors?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that while fraud is increasingly being discovered through routine audits, whistleblowers continue to be a leading source of fraud discovery. We seek research which identifies and measures sources of fraud discovery, changes over time, and explores correlation with fraud category, fraud type, and/or firm characteristics.

Continued research into the relative fraud prevention and detection efficacy of standard audit procedures is required. In addition, however, we seek descriptive submissions which identify "non-standard" auditing techniques, in particular creative physical audit testing techniques that can be rapidly and efficiently applied. Submissions along these lines that utilizes the semi-structured data gathering technique of personal practitioner interviews will receive the utmost preferential consideration, while field-based questionnaires will receive some preferential consideration.

Worldwide revelations of corporate fraud and corruption continue at a mind-numbing rate, literally overwhelming the supply of qualified forensic accountants. We seek submissions from visionary practitioners that, while acknowledging obvious externalities, provide a critical review of historical industry structures, organizations, and practices that have been ineffectual and have contributed to and/or enabled the unprecedented volume of corporate fraud. Recognizing that by their very nature institutions are products of past processes and circumstances, we would hope that such reviews will provide the basis for a forward-looking dialogue regarding industry changes that should be encouraged as one looks to the "next generation" of professional forensic accountants.

Some observers suggest a correlation between "short-term expectations" and corporate fraud. We seek research which attempts to measure the correlation between cultural variables that may have a perceived time aspect, such as employee tenure expectations, bonus opportunity windows, etc. and reported incidents of fraud. Research in this area capable of cross-cultural comparisons will receive preferential consideration. We also seek research into positive incentive schemes with proven effectiveness in motivating neutral financial reporting.